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1. See Ford Fessenden, They Threaten, Seethe and Unhinge, Then Kill in Quantity, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 9, 2000, § 1, at 11 (defining a rampage killing as a multiple-victim killing that is not
primarily domestic or connected to a robbery or a gang). Id. In academic scholarship, many terms
are used to describe the same type of phenomenon. See James Alan Fox & Jack Levin, Multiple
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I.  INTRODUCTION
On April 16, 2007, Seung Hui Cho, a Virginia Tech student, went on
a rampage  across the university’s campus.  He murdered thirty-two1 2
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Homicide: Patterns of Serial and Mass Murder, 23 CRIME & JUST. 407, 408, 437 (1998) (mass
murder, spree killing, going berserk, running amok); John R. Lott, Jr. & William M. Landes,
Multiple Victim Public Shootings, Bombings and Right-to-Carry Concealed Handgun Laws:
Contrasting Private and Public Law Enforcement 1 (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch., John M. Olin Law
& Econs. Working Paper No. 73, 1999) (multiple victim public shooting). For the purposes of this
Note, rampage killings exclude political violence, warfare, and killings committed by more than
a few individuals.
2. VA. TECH REVIEW PANEL, MASS SHOOTINGS AT VIRGINIA TECH, at vii (2007), available
at http://www.governor.virginia.gov/TempContent/techPanelReport-docs/FullReport.pdf
[hereinafter VT REPORT]. Governor Tim Kaine of Virginia formed the Virginia Tech Review Panel,
which included experts in criminology, education, law, law enforcement, and psychology, three
days after the Virginia Tech tragedy. Id. at vii–viii.
3. VT REPORT, supra note 2, at vi. Some journalists speculated that Cho was motivated by
romantic obsession. See, e.g., David Williams & Stefanie Balogh, Was Gunman Crazed over
Emily?, DAILY TELEGRAPH (Sydney, Austl.), Apr. 18, 2007, available at
http://www.news.com.au/dailytelegraph/story/0,22049,21576271-5001021,00.html. However, there
is no evidence that Cho knew any of his victims, including the first two students he shot in West
Ambler Johnston dormitory before his second attack on Norris Hall. See VT REPORT, supra note
2, at 77–78, 86.
4. VT REPORT, supra note 2, at vii. Many rampage killers commit suicide, or are killed by
others, during the rampage; this fact hampers attempts to understand what drives them to kill. See
Fessenden, supra note 1.
5. See VT REPORT, supra note 2, at 5. Cho killed more than twice as many people as Charles
Whitman, the University of Texas shooter. See infra Part II (discussing previous university
shootings, of which the University of Texas shooting was the first and, prior to the Virginia Tech
tragedy, the most deadly). Virginia Tech was the worst mass shooting to take place at any
American educational institution—compare the Columbine High School massacre, in which
thirteen died. See Castaldo v. Stone, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1133 (D. Colo. 2001). However, it was
not the worst mass murder. In 1927, the Bath School bombing claimed forty-five lives. See M.J.
ELLSWORTH, THE BATH SCHOOL DISASTER app. at 2 (1927), available at http://daggy.name/tbsd/
tbsd-t.htm (listing the names of the deceased). The VT REPORT, supra note 2, does not provide a
definition of mass shooting. However, one authority defines mass murder as the slaying of four or
more victims by one or a few individuals attempting to satisfy personal desires. See Fox & Levin,
supra note 1, at 407–08. Most mass murderers use firearms. Id. at 407. 
6. See Loner Filled with Anger and Spite, BBC NEWS, Apr. 19, 2007, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/6564653.stm (discussing “Cho Seung-hui, who staged
America’s worst shooting massacre”). Compare the San Ysidro McDonald’s shooting, where a
dismissed security guard killed twenty-one people. See Mass Slayings and Toll: McDonald’s Case
Biggest, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1987, § 1, at 19. Compare also the Luby’s cafeteria shooting, where
the death toll was twenty-two. See Thomas C. Hayes, Gunman Kills 22 and Himself in Texas
Cafeteria, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1991, at A1.
people —twenty-seven students and five professors—before killing3
himself.  Cho’s rampage was not only the worst mass shooting on an4
American university campus,  it was the worst in American history.5 6
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7. See Randall Mikkelsen, NBC Criticized over Virginia Tech Gunman Video Airing,
REUTERS, Apr. 19, 2007, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/televisionNews/idUSN1820
416720070419 (noting that the videos were shown repeatedly on news programs).
8. Roger Depue, a FBI behavioral scientist, analyzed Cho’s personality and compared it to
that of attention-seeking killers such as John Hinckley, Jr. See VT REPORT, supra note 2,
app. N at 2.
9. See, e.g., id. at 22–23, 44–46 (describing student complaints against Cho for stalking);
id. at 22 (describing Professor Nikki Giovanni’s removal of Cho from her writing class after she
became concerned about the violent content of his writing); id. (noting that Professor Giovanni’s
superior, English Department Chair Lucinda Roy, notified student affairs, the counseling center,
the health center, the campus police, and the university’s “Care Team” about Professor Giovanni’s
concerns). Even Wayne Lo, perpetrator of the Simon’s Rock College of Bard shooting, see infra
Part II, thought that Virginia Tech should have anticipated Cho’s actions. See Samantha Henig,
Eerie Similarities, NEWSWEEK, May 2, 2007, available at http://web.archive.org/web/200705280
65641/ and http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/18442224/site/newsweek/. The interview was a
Newsweek web exclusive and has since been taken off Newsweek’s website. However, it is still
available on web archives such as archive.org. Of course, anyone who retroactively prophesized
the Virginia Tech tragedy may have fallen prey to hindsight bias. See generally DAVID HACKETT
FISCHER, HISTORIANS’ FALLACIES: TOWARD A LOGIC OF HISTORICAL THOUGHT (1970) (describing
a wide array of logical fallacies that plague historical thinkers).
10. VT REPORT, supra note 2, at 35. Cho first expressed thoughts of suicide and homicide
shortly after the Columbine High School shooting in 1999. Id.
11. Id. at 42. Noted horror writer Stephen King notes that his own writing in college would
have raised red flags. Stephen King, On Predicting Violence, ENT. WKLY., Apr. 20, 2007, available
at http://www.ew.com/ew/article/0,,20036014,00.html. “For most creative people, the imagination
serves as an excretory channel for violence: We visualize what we will never actually do . . . . On
the whole, I don’t think you can pick these guys out based on their work, unless you look for
violence unenlivened by any real talent.” Id.
12. VT REPORT, supra note 2, at 42–43. For example, Cho covered his face during class, and
took pictures of his classmates without their permission. Id.
13. Id. at 42, 50. 
14. Id. at 46. After one incident, the student Cho stalked complained. Id. The campus police
told Cho that he was no longer to have contact with her. Id. Shortly thereafter, Cho sent an instant
message to a suitemate saying, “I might as well kill myself.” Id. at 47. This development led to
Cho’s involuntary outpatient treatment. See infra note 15 and accompanying text.
15. VT REPORT, supra note 2, at 47. Because Virginia law prohibits anyone who has been
involuntarily committed from purchasing a firearm, there is some controversy over whether Cho’s
brief hospitalization and subsequent recommendation for outpatient treatment constituted an
involuntary commitment. See Michael Luo, U.S. Rules Made Killer Ineligible to Purchase Gun,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2007, at A1.
Cho’s horrific actions and his highly publicized video manifestos7
revealed a deeply disturbed personality.  But to some students, teachers,8
and administrators, Cho’s nature was not a revelation.  Cho’s troubled9
history included suicidal and homicidal ideation since middle school,10
violent and disturbing writings,  classroom behavior that frightened other11
students,  confrontations with professors,  allegations of stalking,  and12 13 14
involuntary outpatient commitment.  Various university administrators15
and officials knew about individual incidents or aspects of Cho’s history,
3
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16. VT REPORT, supra note 2, at 2.
17. See Sue Lindsey, Lawsuits Possible from Va. Tech Shooting, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct.
14, 2007, available at http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/wireStory?id=3725837. Peter Grenier, who
represented the families of many of the victims, id., also represented the daughter of Dave Sanders,
a victim of the Columbine High School shooting. See Judge Dismisses All but One Lawsuit From
Columbine Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2001, at A16.
18. See, e.g., VT REPORT, supra note 2, at 2 (“During Cho’s junior year at Virginia Tech,
numerous incidents occurred that were clear warnings of mental instability. Although various
individuals and departments within the university knew about each of these incidents, the university
did not intervene effectively.”).
19. Virginia: Settlement in Virginia Tech Shootings, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2008, at A15. Two
of the families that filed notices of claims did not agree to the settlement. Id.
20. See infra Part II (discussing the 1992 Simon’s Rock College of Bard shooting and
subsequent lawsuit, which settled for an undisclosed sum). Rampage killings at American education
institutions seem to be occurring much more frequently than in the past. See VT REPORT, supra
note 2, app. L (listing fatal school shootings in the United States between 1966 and 2007).
However, rampage killings of any kind, especially on a school or university campus, are so rare that
they are difficult to study empirically. See John Lott, Jr., Rampage Killing Facts and Fantasies,
WASH. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2000, at A15, available at 2000 WLNR 349723 (criticizing Fessenden’s
report, supra note 1, for researching only easily identifiable rampage killings, and arguing that there
is no upward trend for multiple-victim shootings “at least since the mid-1970s”).
21. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
but “no one connected all the dots.”16
Some of the victims’ families felt that Virginia Tech had a duty to
connect all the dots. They hired counsel and gave notice of a possible
lawsuit to Virginia’s attorney general’s office.  Given the findings of the17
Virginia Tech Review Panel, attorneys for by the families could have
claimed that the university negligently failed to identify Cho as a threat
and prevent him from carrying out his murderous plan.  Ultimately,18
however, most of the families settled.19
Virginia Tech was not the first university rampage killing for which
victims or their families sought compensation, nor is it likely to be the
last.  Because the current state of the law is unclear, this Note explores20
whether universities should have a duty to identify and thwart students that
pose a threat to the lives of other students. Part II traces the history of
university rampage killings and the sparse legal history surrounding them.
In light of that sparse legal history, Part III considers the Tarasoff case21
and its progeny, which impose upon some professionals a duty to protect
third parties from harm. Finally, Part IV considers and ultimately rejects
the application of a Tarasoff-like duty to protect in the context of
university rampage killings. Part V concludes that imposing upon
universities a duty to prevent rampage killings would accomplish little,
and cause great harm.
4
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22. Despite its connotation of mastery, the word “sharpshooter” is an intermediate rank of
proficiency with a rifle, between “marksman” (the lowest) and “expert” (the highest). See U.S.
MAR IN E  CORPS JU N IO R  ROTC,  CAD E T  HAN D BO O K  18–19,  available at
http://www.mcjrotc.org/Documents/cadetbook.pdf (last visited July 12, 2008).
23. See The Madman in the Tower, TIME, Aug. 12, 1966, available at http://www.time.com/
time/magazine/article/0,9171,842584,00.html. The psychiatrist urged Whitman, unsuccessfully, to
return for another appointment. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. In addition to the comment to the psychiatrist, Whitman’s record reflected problems with
violent outbursts. He had been disciplined for threatening a fellow Marine and had beaten his wife
on several occasions. Id.
27. Whitman’s suicide note requested that an autopsy be performed to check for brain
abnormalities. Id. The autopsy found a pecan-sized brain tumor in his hypothalamus region. Id.
However, it was never determined that the tumor caused his actions, or even that he was mentally
ill. Id. Psychiatrists have speculated that his traumatic childhood, experiences as a Marine,
frustration with school, or use of stimulants could have caused the shooting. Id. Whatever the
reason, his actions indicate a level of insight and planning that is not concordant with the stereotype
of the “psycho killer” who suddenly snaps. See id. (describing Charles Whitman’s meticulous
planning, and his use of disguise and subterfuge to gain access to the Texas Tower). Similarly,
Seung Hui Cho meticulously planned, and may have even rehearsed, the Virginia Tech shooting.
See VT REPORT, supra note 2, at 24. Like Whitman, Wayne Lo, the Simon’s Rock College of Bard
shooter, was able to lie calmly about his intentions prior to the shooting. See infra note 39.
28. Arguably, the university psychiatrist had the best chance of preventing the shooting.
However, the UTA shootings occurred ten years before Tarasoff imposed a duty on psychiatrists
to take reasonable steps to prevent their patients from harming foreseeable victims. See infra Part
III.A. Even if Texas had a Tarasoff statute in 1966, it is unclear whether Whitman’s statements to
the psychiatrist would meet Tarasoff’s requirement of a serious danger to an identifiable individual.
See infra note 77. On the other hand, Whitman did mention the university tower specifically, and
a particular school may be a small enough subset of the general population to be considered
identifiable. See U.S. SECRET SERV. & U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., THE FINAL REPORT AND FINDINGS OF
THE SAFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PREVENTION OF SCHOOL ATTACKS IN THE
UNITED STATES 4 (2002), available at http://www.secretservice.gov/ntac/ssi_final_report.pdf
(describing “targeted” violence as targeting an individual, a particular group, or even an entire
school).
II.  UNIVERSITY RAMPAGE KILLINGS BEFORE VIRGINIA TECH
In March 1966, Charles Whitman, a student at the University of Texas
at Austin (UTA) and former Marine sharpshooter,  told a university22
psychiatrist that he felt an urge to climb the university’s clock tower and
“start shooting people.”  The psychiatrist noted that Whitman was23
“oozing with hostility.”  Four months later, Whitman acted on his urge,24
killing thirteen people and wounding thirty-one before being gunned
down.  There were signs beforehand that Whitman could pose a threat to25
the lives of UTA students;  even Whitman suspected that he might be26
mentally ill.  However, none of the victims or their families filed a lawsuit27
against the university.28
5
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29. See VT REPORT, supra note 2, app. L at 3–5. One such shooting was perpetrated by
Brenda Spencer, who famously remarked that she “didn’t like Mondays” when asked why she fired
on an elementary school, killing two employees. Id. at 4.
30. In 1976, a custodian killed seven coworkers at California State University, Fullerton, but
neither the perpetrator nor the victims were students. Id. at 3.
31. See Michael Marriott, Iowa Gunman Was Torn by Academic Challenge, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 4, 1991, at A12. Gang Lu, unlike many rampage killers, knew his victims personally. Id. Gang
Lu’s motives are not entirely clear, but seem to have involved personal grievances as well as
academic and professional frustration. Id. Unlike Seung Cho’s videos, see supra note 7, the
missives Gang Lu left behind to explain his actions were not published. Marriott, supra.
32. However, Gang Lu’s former roommate described Gang Lu as having a bad temper and
a “psychological problem with being challenged.” Marriott, supra note 31. Prior to the shooting,
Gang Lu’s former roommate warned Gang Lu’s roommate and sole student victim, Linhua Shan,
not to live with Gang Lu. See id.; Dennis Overbye, A Tale of Power and Intrigue in the Lab, Based
on Real Life, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2007, at F3. Like Seung Hui Cho, Gang Lu committed suicide
during his rampage, complicating any attempts to diagnose him with a psychiatric disorder. See id.
33. The surviving student received worker’s compensation. See Manpower Temp. Servs. v.
Sioson, 529 N.W.2d 259, 260 (Iowa 1995). Sioson, who was left a quadriplegic by Gang Lu’s
attack, successfully sued to have her employer cover the cost of a special van that could transport
her wheelchair. Id. at 260–62.
34. Lo was a gifted student, as was Gang Lu, the University of Iowa shooter. See Bard
College at Simon’s Rock, About Simon’s Rock, http://simons-rock.edu/about (last visited May 13,
2008) (describing Simon’s Rock as a college for students of high school age). Although
conventional wisdom posits a connection between intelligence and insanity, it may be that
intelligence and homicidality have a multiplicative effect. Ceteris paribus, a highly intelligent killer
will likely kill more people.
35. See Commonwealth v. Lo, 696 N.E.2d 935, 937 (Mass. 1998). Unlike the university
rampage killers before him, Wayne Lo was captured alive and criminally prosecuted. Id. at 936–37.
36. See College Student Sprays Campus with an Assault Rifle, Killing 2, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
16, 1992, at A20. Like Gang Lu, however, he was described by a colleague as very angry. Id.
37. Lo apparently intended to fake insanity. See Lo, 696 N.E.2d at 937. Prior to the shooting,
he told one friend that he was copying down passages from the Book of Revelations so that people
would think he was crazy. Id.
38. Id.
After the UTA shooting, there were a number of high-profile school
shootings,  but twenty-five more years elapsed before another university29
student committed a rampage killing on campus.  In 1991, after being30
passed over for an academic award, Gang Lu, a University of Iowa
graduate student, killed four professors and one student, and left another
student a quadriplegic.  Gang Lu had neither disciplinary problems nor31
any psychiatric history prior to the attack.  None of the victims or their32
families filed a wrongful death action against the university.33
In 1992, Wayne Lo, a student at Simon’s Rock College of Bard  in34
Massachusetts, killed two and wounded four others on campus.  Like35
Gang Lu, Wayne Lo had no prior disciplinary problems  or psychiatric36
history.  Prior to the shooting, the dean of the College received a package,37
addressed to Lo, from a gun shop.  The dean gave the package to Lo,38
6
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39. Wayne Lo told the dean that the package contained a gift for his father. Id. After the
shooting, the Dean said that he didn’t investigate further because of privacy concerns. See William
Glaberson, Man and His Son’s Slayer Unite to Ask Why, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2000, at A1.
40. Glaberson, supra note 39.





45. See Glaberson, supra note 39. In 2000, the college issued a statement saying that, “[i]f
mistakes were made prior to [the shooting] . . . such mistakes must be viewed in the context of the
setting and of the times.” Id.
46. Id.
47. See Scott Wallace, Gunman Kills Three at Virgina [sic] School, TIME, Jan. 16, 2002,
available at http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,194552,00.html.
48. Id.
49. Mary Shaffrey, Shooting Suspect ‘a Real Oddball’; Wife Had Protective Order; Doctor
Recalls Erratic Behavior, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2002, at B1. The first two victims—the dean who
suspended him and a professor—were shot and then “executed” (presumably, shot again at close
range). Wallace, supra note 47. The remaining victims were shot “at random” as Odighizuwa fled.
Id.
50. See Wallace, supra note 47. The doctor who treated Odighizuwa for stress was also the
county coroner. Id. It is unclear how much training in psychiatry he had.
51. Odighizuwa, like Wayne Lo, survived his rampage attack. Id. See Chris Kahn, Ex-Law
Student Admits to Slayings, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 27, 2004, available at http://www.washington
post.com/wp-dyn/articles/A12363-2004Feb27.html (stating Odihizuwa’s diagnosis).
52. Id.
53. Id. More specifically, Odighizuwa was a Nigerian immigrant. Id.
54. See John Gravois, Law School to Pay $1-Million to Settle Lawsuits that Resulted from
unopened;  it contained ammunition and rifle parts later used in the39
shooting.  Three hours before the shooting, one of Lo’s friends phoned in40
an anonymous tip about the impending attack to a resident advisor in Lo’s
dormitory.  Although the dean and the provost were notified almost an41
hour before the shooting,  they took no action.  The family of a student42 43
slain by Lo sued Simon’s Rock.  Although the college never admitted44
negligence,  it settled the lawsuit for an undisclosed amount.45 46
Ten years later, Peter Odighizuwa, a forty-three-year-old student at the
Appalachian School of Law in Virginia, killed three people and wounded
three more.  Odighizuwa had been academically suspended one year47
before the shooting.  Although he returned to school, he was academically48
suspended again immediately prior to the shooting.  Odighizuwa had also49
been treated by a medical doctor for stress.  Afterwards, he was diagnosed50
with paranoid schizophrenia.  The family of the one student slain in the51
attack, along with the three wounded students, sued the school for
$22.8 million.  Their complaint alleged that the school coddled52
Odighizuwa, despite his academic difficulties, because he was black.  The53
university settled for $1 million.54
7
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Student’s Shooting Spree, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), Jan. 14, 2005, at A27.
55. At a minimum, universities seem aware that any student death may leave them open to
liability. See infra note 155 (discussing cases in which universities expelled mentally ill students
for fear of liability for suicide).
56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 314, 315 (1965).
57. Id. § 316; see also Janelle A. Weber, Note, Don’t Drink, Don’t Smoke, Don’t Download:
Parents’ Liability For Their Children’s File Sharing, FLA. L. REV. 1163, 1191–92 (2005).
58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 320 (1965). In either case, any duty owed is
predicated on the actual ability of the parent or sheriff to control the actions of the dangerous party.
Id. §§ 316(a), 320(a).
59. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
60. See infra Part III.A (discussing the facts of the Tarasoff case, and the court’s reasoning).
61. See infra Part III.B (discussing the application of Tarasoff-like duties to other
professionals).
62. See infra Part III.C (discussing university suicide cases).
63. A special relationship with the rampage killer could be relevant in two ways. The first
is that the university might have a duty to protect third parties from the rampage killer. The second
is that the university might have a duty to protect the rampage killer from himself. Like Seung Hui
Cho, Charles Whitman, and Gang Lu, about half of rampage killers die during their rampages. See
Fessenden, supra note 1. Thus, a discussion of university liability for student suicide may be
relevant. See infra Part III.C. Of course, the idea of a rampage killer’s next-of-kin suing a university
for wrongful death seems preposterous.
64. For a fuller analysis of the history of university tort liability, see Valerie Kravets Cohen,
Note, Keeping Students Alive: Mandating On-Campus Counseling Saves Suicidal College Students’
Recent incidents demonstrate that survivors of university rampage
killings are willing to sue, and universities are willing to settle. Thus, a
university’s potential duty to protect student lives exists, at the very least,
within the minds of university counsel.55
III.  TARASOFF’S LONG SHADOW: THE DUTY TO PROTECT THIRD
 PARTIES FROM HARM
No court has ever stated that universities owe a duty to prevent a
rampage killing. So why do universities think they may have a duty to
prevent rampage killings? A person has no duty to prevent harm caused by
another, unless the person has a special relationship with either the
dangerous party or the potential victim.  For example, a parent has a duty56
to prevent harm caused by the parent’s child,  and a sheriff has a duty to57
prevent harm caused to the sheriff’s prisoner.  Similarly, Tarasoff v.58
Regents of the University of California  imposed a duty on mental health59
professionals to prevent harm caused by their patients.  In the wake of60
Tarasoff, courts have found special relationships in a wide variety of
circumstances,  including between a university and a suicidal student.61 62
To determine whether a university has a special relationship with a student
rampage killer,  or with his potential victims, courts will likely consider63
Tarasoff and the myriad cases that extend its reasoning.64
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Lives and Limits Liability, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 3081 (2007). 
65. See infra note 75.
66. The Tarasoff case discussed here is a rehearing of the original, heard only two years
earlier. See Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 529 P.2d 553 (Cal. 1974). The California
Supreme Court might have granted the rehearing because of the controversy arising out of the first
Tarasoff case. See Vanessa Merton, Confidentiality and the “Dangerous” Patient: Implications of
Tarasoff for Psychiatrists and Lawyers, 31 EMORY L.J. 263, 294 (1982).
67. Douglas Mossman, Critique of Pure Risk Assessment or, Kant Meets Tarasoff, 75 U. CIN.
L. REV. 523, 524 (2006) (describing Tarasoff as the “most influential ruling in mental disability
law”).
68. Christopher Slobogin, Tarasoff as a Duty to Treat: Insights from Criminal Law, 75 U.
CIN. L. REV. 645, 645 (2006).
69. See infra Part III.B (discussing the application of the Tarasoff duty to other situations).
70. See Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 345 (Cal. 1976). See generally
People v. Poddar, 518 P.2d 342, 344 (Cal. 1974) (describing Poddar and Tarasoff’s relationship
before the murder).
71. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 341.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 343.
75. Id. at 340 (“When a therapist determines, or pursuant to the standards of his profession
should determine, that his patient presents a serious danger of violence to another, he incurs an
obligation to use reasonable care to protect the intended victim against such danger.”); see also id.
at 345 (“[O]nce a therapist does in fact determine, or under applicable professional standards
reasonably should have determined, that a patient poses a serious danger of violence to others, he
A.  The Duty of Mental Health Professionals to Protect Third Parties
from Violent Patients 
Thirty-four years ago, Tarasoff established the duty of mental health
professionals to protect third parties from violent patients.  The Tarasoff65
decision, controversial at the time,  remains the subject of much academic66
discourse.  However, the duty of mental health professionals to protect67
third parties from violent patients has withstood the test of time,  and has68
been extended in some jurisdictions.69
Tarasoff involved a therapist who believed that his patient, a graduate
student named Prosenjit Poddar, would follow through on his threats to kill
a fellow student, Tatiana Tarasoff, who had rejected Poddar’s romantic
overtures.  The therapist contacted campus police, but when the police70
interviewed Poddar they concluded that he was rational and could not be
involuntarily committed.  Two months later, Poddar stabbed Tarasoff to71
death.  Tarasoff’s parents sued the therapist.  The California Supreme72 73
Court found that the therapist had a special relationship with Poddar.74
Because the therapist had determined that Poddar posed a serious danger
of violence to Tarasoff, the Court found that the therapist had a duty to use
reasonable care to protect her.  The Court held that calling the police was75
9
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bears a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect the foreseeable victim of that danger.”).
76. Id. at 340 (“[T]his duty may require the therapist to take one or more of various
steps . . . . [I]t may call for him to warn the intended victim or others likely to apprise the victim
of the danger, to notify the police, or to take whatever other steps are reasonably necessary under
the circumstances.”).
77. The Court in Tarasoff may have considered duty appropriate only where the therapist
could know the identity of a potential victim (or, at most, a small number of potential victims). See
Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 345 n.11 (“We recognize that in some cases it would be unreasonable to
require the therapist to interrogate his patient to discover the victim’s identity, or to conduct an
independent investigation. But there may also be cases in which a moment’s reflection will reveal
the victim's identity.”).
78.  See supra note 75 (stating the holding of Tarasoff).
79.  Critically, the determination of whether a therapist should know that a patient is a threat
is based on professional standards. See supra note 75; see also infra Part IV.A (arguing that the
overwhelming majority of university employees have no professional standards for evaluating
potentially violent students).
80.  What constitutes a “serious” danger remains the elephant in the Tarasoff jurisprudential
room. See generally Mossman, supra note 67, at 577 (discussing widespread differences in opinion
about what constitutes “serious danger”).
81. This requirement may seem obvious, but it is important enough to be included, for
example, in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 316
(1965) (predicating a parent’s duty to control the parent’s child on the parent’s ability to control
the child); cf. infra Part IV.C (discussing the difficulty in determining what reasonable steps, if any,
are available to university administrators faced with a potentially violent student).
82. See Ann Hubbard, Symposium Introduction, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 429, 429 (2006) (opening
a symposium discussing Tarasoff’s thirtieth anniversary). On the other hand, some states, including
Florida, declined to follow Tarasoff. See, e.g., Boynton v. Burglass, 590 So. 2d 446, 447 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1991). For the purposes of this Note, “Tarasoff doctrine” means the Tarasoff case and those
cases and statutes that rely upon and extend its reasoning.
83. See Hubbard, supra note 82, at 429. See also Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the
not enough to satisfy the therapist’s duty, and that the therapist’s failure to
warn Tarasoff could support a negligence claim.76
Although Tarasoff involved a therapist whose patient had made an
express threat against a single, identifiable third party,  the California77
Supreme Court framed the duty to protect in broader terms.  Indeed,78
Tarasoff imposes a duty to protect third parties on: 
1) a mental health professional 
2) who knows or should know  that a patient poses a79
serious  danger of violence to a foreseeable victim, and80
3) who is able to take reasonable steps to protect the third
party.  81
B.  The Growth of the Tarasoff Doctrine 
The courts and legislatures of many other states have adopted the
Tarasoff rule.  Some courts extended the California Supreme Court’s82
reasoning.  One court imposed a duty on mental health professionals to83
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Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026, 1098 (discussing the role of judicial attitude shifting in
the extension of judicial precedent).
84. See Mossman, supra note 67, at 546 (discussing Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F.
Supp. 185 (D. Neb. 1980)). The killer in Lipari slayed a stranger in a nightclub. Id. His therapists
had never heard the killer threaten anyone, much less the victim. Id. Rather than rely on a patient’s
threatening expression or conduct, the court essentially required that the therapists forecast their
patient’s general future dangerousness. Id. It is unclear what the therapists could have done, had
they decided that the killer was dangerous. Certainly, the idea of warning every possible victim of
a violent patient seems to clash with footnote eleven in Tarasoff. See supra note 77 (discussing
footnote eleven, in which the Tarasoff court evaluates the duty to protect in terms of a single
victim).
85. See Mossman, supra note 67, at 547–48 (discussing Jablonski ex rel. Pahls v. United
States, 712 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1983), abandoned by In re McLinn, 739 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1984)).
Jablonski, a mental patient, murdered his girlfriend. Id. at 547. Although Jablonski had never
threatened his girlfriend, his psychiatric record reflected that he had had violent thoughts about his
former wife. Id. at 547–48. The court found that the psychiatrist’s failure to warn Jablonski’s
girlfriend had been a proximate cause of her death, because Jablonski’s “psychological profile
indicated that his violence was likely to be directed against women very close to him.” Id. (quoting
Jablonski, 712 F.2d at 398). Dr. Mossman notes that the court in Jablonski assumed that “there can
be a crystal-clear distinction between those patients who do and do not have ‘psychological
profiles’ portending particular types of violence.” Id. at 548. Use of a psychological profile or
psychological history raises the question of whether the harm is imminent: Jablonski’s homicidal
ideas about his wife occurred in 1968, ten years before he murdered his girlfriend. See Jablonski,
712 F.2d at 393. See generally Robert I. Simon, The Myth of “Imminent” Violence in Psychiatry
and the Law, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 631 (2006) (criticizing the application of the requirement in
Tarasoff statutes and involuntary commitment proceedings that the potentially violent person pose
an imminent threat). Requiring that a patient threaten imminent harm prevents unnecessary
deprivation of liberty. Id. at 635. The alternative would be to allow the involuntary commitment
of anyone who has ever demonstrated a potential for violence. On the other hand, Jablonski also
threatened to rape the victim’s mother a few days before he killed the victim; he may not be the
best example of the mutability of human nature. See Jablonski, 712 F.2d at 393–94. 
86. See Mossman, supra note 67, at 548–49 (discussing Petersen v. State, 671 P.2d 230
(Wash. 1983)).
87. See Sarah Buel & Margaret Drew, Do Ask and Do Tell: Rethinking the Lawyer’s Duty
to Warn in Domestic Violence Cases, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 447, 488 (2006). Pharmacists have a duty
to warn their customers of dangerous combinations of medicines. Id. However, this “duty to warn”
is not analogous to the Tarasoff duty. The pharmacist’s duty to protect her customer is not the same
as the Tarasoff duty to protect a third party.
88. Id. at 490. A California appellate court ruled that doctors have a duty to warn the intimate
protect unidentifiable but foreseeable victims of violent patients, even
when the patient had made no threats.  Another court held that, in the84
absence of an actual threat, the therapist must interpret the
patient’s “psychological profile” to predict future violence.  A third court85
broadened the Tarasoff duty to encompass reckless, in addition to
intentional, acts committed by patients.  Although these cases expanded86
the reach of Tarasoff considerably, they were limited to cases involving
the liability of mental health professionals.
However, other post-Tarasoff cases have extended the duty to protect
to pharmacists,  doctors treating AIDS patients,  and hospitals accepting87 88
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partners of AIDS patients. Id.
89. Id. at 490–91. As with the pharmacist’s duty to warn her customers, see supra note 87,
the hospital’s duty to warn is based on a direct relationship with its employees, rather than a
third-party relationship. Furthermore, the duty to warn is based on a known danger—the possibility
of exposure to HIV—rather than a purely speculative one, such as future conduct. HIV can be
diagnosed reliably, unlike a propensity for future violent conduct. See infra Part IV.B.
90. The duty is no longer restricted to violence, or even to intentional acts. See supra note
86 and accompanying text.
91. See supra note 84 (discussing Lipari).
92. In some jurisdictions, the victims need not be identifiable, only foreseeable. See id. 
93. See supra note 81; see also infra Part IV.C (arguing that, because universities may be
unable to take reasonably necessary steps to prevent rampage killings, they should not have a duty
imposed upon them to do so).
94. See supra note 75.
95. 236 F. Supp. 2d 602 (W.D. Va. 2002). 




Taken together, the post-Tarasoff cases suggest that a duty to protect
may be imposed on: 
1) any professional 
2) who knows or should know that a client or customer poses
a serious danger of harm  to any number  of foreseeable90 91 92
victims, and
3) who is able to take reasonable steps to protect the third
party or parties.93
C.  The Duty of Universities to Protect Suicidal Students from
Themselves
Wrongful death actions against universities for failing to prevent
student suicide present a Tarasoff-like situation. If post-Tarasoff cases
potentially impose upon professionals a duty to protect the intended victim
of a dangerous person, then suicide cases are simply a special case in
which the intended victim and the dangerous person are the same
individual. Of course, warning someone that he might commit suicide
seems rather less informative than the typical Tarasoff warning. However,
Tarasoff states that the duty to protect might be satisfied by taking other
reasonably necessary steps,  such as notifying a parent or intervening94
directly.
Schieszler v. Ferrum College  involved a wrongful death suit arising95
out of the suicide of Michael Frentzel.  Prior to his death, Frentzel sent a96
note to his girlfriend indicating an intention to commit suicide.  Upon97
learning of the note, the dean of student affairs required Frentzel to sign
12
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101. Schieszler. 236 F. Supp. 2d at 605–06.
102. Id. at 609.
103. Id. (“This last fact, more than any other, indicates that the defendants believed Frentzel
was likely to harm himself.”). This point makes Schieszler similar to Tarasoff in that the court
found a duty based on the actual knowledge of the defendant, rather than what the defendant should
have known.
104. See Eric Hoover, Judge Rules Suicide Suit Against MIT Can Proceed, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), Aug. 12, 2005, at A1, available at http://chronicle.com/free/v51/i49/49a00
101.htm.
105. No. 020403, 2005 WL 1869101 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 27, 2005).
106. Id. at *1.
107. See id. at *2,*4–5.
108. Id. at *2. The practice is colloquially referred to as “cutting.” See id. 
109. Id. at *5.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See id. at *14.
113. Id. at *13 (citing 236 F. Supp. 2d 602 (W.D. Va. 2002)).
a statement that he would not injure himself, but otherwise the dean took
no action.  Days later, Frentzel sent another note, but the university took98
no action except to forbid Frentzel’s girlfriend from checking his room.99
After Frentzel sent a third note, university employees checked his room
and found that he had hanged himself.100
After being sued by Frentzel’s estate, the university moved for
dismissal, arguing they had no duty to protect Frentzel.  The court held101
that, while it was unlikely that a special relationship existed as a matter of
Virginia law between universities and their students, one might exist given
the particular facts of the case.  In particular, the statement that the dean102
of student affairs required Frentzel to sign clearly indicated that the
university knew of the danger to Frentzel’s life.  After the court denied103
the motion to dismiss, the university settled, admitting “shared
responsibility” for Frentzel’s suicide.104
Shin v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology  dealt with another105
student suicide.  Like Michael Frentzel, Elizabeth Shin had repeatedly106
threatened suicide before her death.  MIT administrators had knowledge107
not only of her threats, but of her practice of cutting herself.  On the day108
she had planned to commit suicide, Shin phoned a MIT administrator and
told her “[y]ou won’t have to worry about me any more.”  The109
administrators made a psychiatric appointment for her for the next day.110
Shin killed herself that night.  Her parents sued, claiming that more111
timely intervention could have saved their daughter’s life.  In a holding112
based in part upon Schiezsler,  the court found that the administrators113
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114. Id. The cause of action against MIT itself was dismissed. Id. at *1.
115. Barbara Lauren, MIT Student Suicide Case Settled Out of Court, AACRAO TRANSCRIPT,
Apr. 5, 2006, http://www.aacrao.org/transcript/index.cfm?fuseaction=show_view&doc_id=3116.
116. See supra notes 95–99, 105–10 and accompanying text. 
117. The closest case was that of Wayne Lo. Arguably, the dean of Simon’s Rock should have
known that Lo was a threat based on the anonymous tip and the dean’s personal knowledge that Lo
had received a package from a gun store. However, none of the dean’s actions indicated that he
actually believed that Lo was a threat. See supra notes 34–46 and accompanying text.
118. In either case, survivors sue a university for failing to prevent one college student from
murdering another.
119. Cf. supra notes 70–73 and accompanying text (describing the situation giving rise to
Tarasoff’s murder).
120. “[T]he judgment of the therapist . . . in predicting whether a patient presents a serious
danger of violence is comparable to the judgment which doctors and professionals must regularly
render . . . .” Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 345 (Cal. 1976).
with actual knowledge of the threat to Shin’s life were in a special
relationship with her.  Those administrators then settled.114 115
In both Schieszler and Shin, the students made express threats of
suicide;  no university rampage killer has been as forthcoming.  A116 117
troubling story, a bad temper, or offensive conduct is a far cry from
repeated suicide notes or even attempts. Although the holdings in the
suicide cases were based on the actual knowledge of university officials,
court findings that universities owe a duty to prevent student suicides may
explain why universities fear that they owe a duty to prevent rampage
killings as well. If nothing else, universities may owe a duty to prevent
rampage killers from killing themselves.
IV.  A SQUARE PEG FOR A BULLET HOLE: APPLYING THE TARASOFF
DUTY TO UNIVERSITY RAMPAGE KILLINGS
The expansion of the Tarasoff doctrine raises the question: Why
shouldn’t courts apply the Tarasoff duty to university rampage killings?
In fact, courts might do just that. However, the court’s reasoning in
Tarasoff was premised upon the facts of the case. Despite the superficial
resemblance,  university rampage killings involve facts very different118
from those of Prosenjit Proddar’s murder of Tatiana Tarasoff.119
A.  Most University Employees Cannot Rely on Professional
     Standards to Predict Violence
In light of the expansion of the Tarasoff doctrine, there clearly is no
requirement that the party charged with the duty be a mental health
professional. However, an expectation exists that the party charged with
the duty be professionally capable of forecasting harm.  A pharmacist or120
doctor, like a therapist, has extensive training in predicting specific types
14
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121. Of course, a therapist’s training is far less effective in this regard than that of a doctor.
See infra Part IV.B (discussing the difficulty in reliably predicting future violent conduct).
122. For example, mental health professionals employed by the university may be uniquely
capable of forecasting student violence or, as suggested by Stephen King, English professors could
potentially identify threats based on their students’ lack of literary talent. See supra note 11.
123. “[T]he therapist need only exercise ‘that reasonable degree of skill, knowledge, and care
ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of [that professional specialty] . . . .’” Tarasoff,
551 P.2d at 345 (second alteration in original) (quoting Bardessono v. Michels, 478 P.2d 480, 484
(Cal. 1970)).
124. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
125. This observation leads to an interesting wrinkle. If everyone is equally (in)capable at
predicting violence, then arguably it is non-professionals who should have a duty to warn about
potentially violent people, as non-professionals do not have a duty of confidentiality. See Slobogin,
supra note 68, at 655.
126. See, e.g., Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 345 (comparing the judgment of a therapist with that of
a medical doctor); id. at 346 (concluding that “professional inaccuracy in predicting violence
cannot negate the therapist’s duty to protect”); id. (stating that inaccurate warnings were a
reasonable price to pay to save lives). 
127. “Reliably predicting any type of violence is extremely difficult. Predicting that an
individual who has never acted out violently in the past will do so in the future is still more
difficult. Seeking to predict acts that occur as rarely as school shootings is almost impossible.”
MARY ELLEN O’TOOLE, FBI, THE SCHOOL SHOOTER: A THREAT ASSESSMENT PERSPECTIVE 3
(2004), available at http://www.fbi.gov/publications/school/school2.pdf. Although addressed to
secondary school shooters, the discussion of threat assessment is phrased in general terms. Id. at 1.
128. See, e.g., PHILIP K. DICK, The Minority Report, in THE MINORITY REPORT AND OTHER
CLASSIC STORIES BY PHILIP K. DICK (Citadel Press 2002) (1956) (describing a dystopian future in
which the police detect crimes and punish criminals before the crimes have been committed).
of harm.  Although some employees of a university, such as mental121
health counselors, may be uniquely capable of forecasting student
violence,  the vast majority are not. Most university employees, even122
those involved in student affairs, counseling, or discipline, are not doctors
of psychology or psychiatry. Determining whether someone should have
known something, for the purposes of Tarasoff, depends on the existence
of professional standards.  For example, a professor of fluid mechanics123
surely is a professional, but her profession has no standards for predicting
student violence. If we are willing to hold the fluid mechanics professor
to the standard of the “reasonable fluid mechanics professor” faced with
a potentially violent student, then the Tarasoff exception for
“professionals” has entirely swallowed the common law rule.124
B.  Universities Cannot Reliably Predict Rampage Killings
Moreover, there may be no one who is professionally capable of
predicting future violent acts.  The problem, brushed off so readily by the125
majority in Tarasoff,  is that it is extremely difficult to reliably predict126
future violent conduct.  This isn’t merely a Phildickian  epistemological127 128
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129. See, e.g., Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 360 n.5 (Clark, J., dissenting) (noting that among 989
patients assessed as too dangerous to be kept in civil mental hospitals, only seven committed, or
even threatened, an act sufficiently dangerous to warrant a transfer to maximum security hospitals
within the next year).
130. This analogy is imperfect in light of Stoppard’s popular work on successive deterministic
coin flips. See TOM STOPPARD, ROSENCRANTZ & GUILDENSTERN ARE DEAD (Grove Press, 2002)
(1967). One could argue that a (fair) coin toss is random, while the propensity for violence of an
individual is not. However, a success rate of seven in 989, see supra note 129, suggests that, even
if we assume that future violent conduct is deterministic to some extent, psychiatric predictions of
future violent conduct are less accurate than a random distribution. In other words, the psychiatrists
would be better off flipping coins.
131. More troubling still is the possibility of imputing the aggregate knowledge of the
population of a university to the university as legal entity. Thus, a university “should know” what
its employees (or even its students) know. The consequences of imposing such a requirement on
a university are beyond the scope of this Note. Rules of decision for even trivially simple cases are
not readily apparent. Given person P, and integers M and N: If M people know that P is not going
to go on a rampage, and N people know that P will, what does the university know?
132. See Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 340 (stating that the therapist must protect the intended victim
against the danger predicted).
133. The critical word here is “reliable.” It is simple to predict rampage killings by stating:
“Every person will go on a rampage killing.” Such a statement will identify every rampage killer,
but will generate so many false positives as to be useless. However, one could imagine a
procedurally generated college brochure that warns every student that each other student could
murder her. It is unclear whether such a brochure would satisfy any duty to warn.
134. O’TOOLE, supra note 127, at 3.
135. See VT REPORT, supra note 2, app. L (listing school and university rampage killings).
concern; empirical data strongly suggest that the therapist’s prediction of
violence in Tarasoff was nothing more than an unhappy accident.  If a129
person says, prior to flipping a coin, “heads,” neither possible outcome
indicates that the person knew the result.  And because actual knowledge130
of future violence eludes even professionals, the idea of constructive
knowledge—that someone ought to have known—holds little meaning.131
Furthermore, if the Tarasoff doctrine were applied to university
rampage killings, mere knowledge of unspecified future violence could not
suffice to create a duty.  Any duty to prevent harm from a university132
rampage killing would be predicated on knowledge that a university
rampage killing would occur. While violent acts, generally, are extremely
difficult to predict, reliable  prediction of a rampage killing is impossible.133
 “[W]hen the incidence of any form of violence is very low and a very
large number of people have identifiable risk factors, there is no reliable
way to pick out from that large group the very few who will actually
commit the violent act.”  The incidence of rampage killings is extremely134
low.  In the absence of specific evidence of a planned rampage threat135
assessments are instead based on the characteristics of a potentially
dangerous student. However, university rampage killers share the
characteristics of millions of other students who will never murder
16
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136. Cf. O’TOOLE, supra note 127, at 2–3 (discussing the millions of secondary-school
students who share characteristics of school shooters, but commit no crime).
137. See VT REPORT, supra note 2, app. M.
138. Nonetheless, some courts would impute knowledge of harm to a therapist with knowledge
of the “psychological profile” of a dangerous person. See supra note 85.
139. See Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 339–42 (Cal. 1976) (Poddar
stated that he would kill Tarasoff when she came back from Brazil). The Court was not insensitive
to the difficulties attendant a single unidentifiable victim. See id. at 345 n.11 (stating that it would
be unreasonable to require a therapist to interrogate a patient to determine the identity of the
potential victim). Such difficulties are obviously compounded by having a large number of
unidentifiable victims, and affect the balance of interests that applied in Tarasoff. See infra Part
IV.C (discussing the difficulty of warning an amorphous population rather than an individual). But
see Mossman, supra note 84 (discussing Lipari, a Tarasoff-like case in which the victims were
strangers, and thus could not have been identified by the therapist).
140. The difference here is best demonstrated by comparing a threat to a particular student and
a threat to an entire campus including that particular student. Of course, it may be easier to rule out
a threat to an unavailable individual (e.g., Napoleon Bonaparte) than to a group of people.
141. See Simon, supra note 85, at 635 (discussing civil liberties implications of the “imminent
threat” requirement in duty to warn and involuntary commitment statutes).
142. See, e.g., supra note 129.
anyone.  For example, the Virginia Tech report identifies “strangeness,”136
wearing black clothes, drinking alcohol, and breaking rules as risk factors
for rampage killings.  These risk factors are hardly unusual. Thus, the137
overwhelming majority of people identified as a potential threat are no
threat at all.138
The difficulty in predicting violence is compounded further by another
significant difference between Tarasoff and university rampage killings.
Tarasoff dealt with a specific, identified person in imminent danger.  The139
larger the pool of possible victims (for example, the entire populace of a
university), the more difficult it is to rule out the possibility of a threat.140
Similarly, projections into the distant future create even more uncertainty
about whether someone will or will not cause harm. The duty to protect
should be restricted to specific, imminent threats, not only out of fairness
to the person charged with a duty, but to protect the rights of people
labeled as threats.141
The sum of all these factors is that no one can reliably know who is a
potential threat, but no one can prove that he won’t, some day, harm
someone else. The consequences of failing to predict that someone will be
violent are potentially severe for the predictor or school administrator, but
the consequences of inaccurately predicted violence fall upon the potential
bad actor, or student. It’s no surprise that psychiatric professionals tend to
err dramatically on the side of false positives.  What, then, can be142
expected of laypeople? Better to admit that no one can reliably predict a
rampage killing, and that the Tarasoff duty should not apply.
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143. “Reasonably necessary steps” is a rephrase of a portion of the rule stated by the Tarasoff




147. See, e.g., Buel & Drew, supra note 87 (describing a Tarasoff-like duty as a duty to warn).
148. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 340.
149. See id. at 346 (“Weighing the uncertain and conjectural character of the alleged damage
done the patient by such a warning against the peril to the victim’s life, we conclude that
professional inaccuracy in predicting violence cannot negate the therapist’s duty to protect the
threatened victim.”).
150. See supra Part IV.B.
C.  Universities May Not be Able to Take Reasonable Steps to Prevent
Rampage Killings
Despite the lack of professional standards, a court might consider some
university employees to have relevant professional expertise in predicting
violence. Furthermore, a court might decide, contrary to all evidence, that
those employees are capable of reliably predicting rampage killings.
Alternatively, like the court in Tarasoff, a court might decide that all the
false positives are a reasonable cost in order to save lives. However,
university rampage killings implicate different concerns than do individual
homicides, and a duty to take reasonably necessary steps to prevent a
rampage killing is only meaningful or fair if that duty could possibly be
discharged.143
Unfortunately, the court in Tarasoff provides little in the way of
guidance. The court first states that the duty might require calling the
police; however, the defendant in Tarasoff did not escape liability by doing
so.  Second, the court states that the duty might require a direct or144
indirect warning to the potential victim.  Finally, the court states that the145
duty might require “whatever other steps are reasonably necessary under
the circumstances.”  It’s no surprise, then, that Tarasoff is often read to146
create a duty to warn,  even though the court phrases it as a duty to use147
reasonable care to prevent danger.148
The problem is that the duty to warn in the context of a university
rampage killing is completely different from the duty to warn applied in
Tarasoff. The court in Tarasoff weighed the “uncertain and conjectural”
damage done by an inaccurate warning against the possibility of saving
someone’s life.  In the context of university rampage killings, the149
probability of an inaccurate warning is astronomical.  Moreover, the150
damage done to a “dangerous” student by warning every person who might
foreseeably be killed by that student cannot be overstated. It would be
more merciful for the university, in the practice of the ancient Greeks, to
write the accused’s name down on a broken pottery shard and exile him
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151. See Robert C.L. Moffat, “Not the Law’s Business:” The Politics of Tolerance and the
Enforcement of Morality, 57 FLA. L. REV. 1097, 1100 (2005) (discussing John Stuart Mill’s
criticism of ostracism in the absence of actually harmful behavior).
152. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 347.
153. Id. at 347 n.14.
154. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 346.
155. On several occasions, universities have settled lawsuits brought by mentally ill students
who were expelled because the university feared liability if the student committed suicide. See, e.g.,
Press Release, Bazelon Ctr. for Mental Health Law, Hunter College Settles Lawsuit by Student
Barred from Dorm after Treatment for Depression (Aug. 23, 2006), available at
http://bazelon.org/newsroom/2006/8-23-06-hunter-settlement.html (announcing settlement between
the university and a student who was suspended after her suicide attempt).
156. The Appalachian School of Law shooter was academically suspended, and subsequently
started his rampage by killing the people who suspended him. See supra Part II. It’s easy to imagine
a troubled student having a very similar reaction to being expelled.
properly.  The Tarasoff court accepted the premise that the therapist must151
protect the patient’s privacy.  It argued persuasively that issuing a152
warning to a single victim was a lesser violation of the dangerous person’s
privacy than involuntary commitment.  However, involuntary153
commitment would be far more discreet than warning every one of a
student’s peers, professors, and neighbors that the student might kill them.
The damage to the falsely accused is neither uncertain nor conjectural; at
minimum, the student would be constructively expelled. As such, the
Tarasoff warning cannot be considered a “reasonable” step in the
university setting.
Given that neither warning the police nor the potential victims could
satisfy the duty to protect students from rampage killings, universities are
left with few options indeed. Measures that may be “necessary” to protect
students from a rampage killer may not be reasonable, or even available.
As the Tarasoff court notes, the level of evidence of dangerousness
required to support an involuntary commitment is higher than that required
to invoke the Tarasoff duty.  Similarly, an attempt to expel a troubled154
student would be difficult to support based on the mere speculation that he
might one day prove dangerous.  And it is far from clear that expelling155
a student would help matters.  The Tarasoff warning served as a stopgap.156
In its absence, the inconsistency between what measures are required, and
what measures are actually available, looms much larger.
Thus, although the Tarasoff decision seems relevant at first glance, its
reasoning cannot be extended to the context of university rampage killings.
A therapist who knows that his patient will kill a particular individual is
too far removed from a university administrator who feels that a particular
student is acting strangely. Applying the Tarasoff duty to universities
would require juries to determine, based on nonexistent professional
standards, whether universities should have known something unknowable,
and, if so, whether they then should have done the impossible.
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157. See VT REPORT, supra note 2, app. M at 2, 4 (describing an interest in “[v]iolent fantasy
content” and “being able to view cruelty without being disturbed” as indicators of future violence).
158. See id. at 3 (describing “[a]nger problems” and “[h]omicidal ideation” as indicators of
future violence). The report defines “[h]omicidal ideation” rather broadly as “[e]xpress[ing]
contempt for other(s).” Id.
159. See id. (describing “[s]uicidal ideation” as an indicator of future violence). 
160. See id. (describing “[f]ascination with weapons and accoutrements” as an indicator of
future violence).
161. See id. (describing “[b]oasting and practicing of fighting and combat proficiency” as an
indicator of future violence). 
162. See id. (describing “[r]efusal to abide by written and/or verbal rules” as an indicator of
future violence). The class had a compulsory attendance policy. 
163. See VT REPORT, supra note 2, app. M at 4 (describing an “[u]nusual interest
in . . . military . . . activities” as an indicator of future violence).
164. See id. at 3 (describing being “[i]solated and socially withdrawn” as an indicator of future
violence).
165. See id. at 1–4. The author concedes that “[a] single warning sign by itself usually does
not warrant overt action by a threat assessment specialist.” Id. at 2. Presumably, eleven warning
signs would warrant some sort of action. In contrast, nothing in the newspaper reports indicate that
Gang Lu possessed more than three or four. See supra Part II (describing the University of Iowa
shooter, Gang Lu, who had no prior psychiatric or disciplinary record). 
166. To my knowledge.
V.  CONCLUSION
During the month of October 2007, I watched a movie about vampires
attacking Alaska,  made a rude gesture at someone in traffic,  made a157 158
“shoot myself in the head” gesture during a long lecture,  doodled a159
cartoon biplane in same,  pinned someone during wrestling practice,160 161
skipped class to watch a Moot Court competition,  browsed Vauban’s162
Manual of Siegecraft and Fortification  and worked extensively on this163
Note.  In just one month, I manifested eleven of the twenty-two warning164
signs that the Virginia Tech report associated with school shooters.165
Although I read, spoke, and wrote endlessly about suicide and homicide,
no one reported me to the authorities.166
The university is neither prison nor asylum. The function of the
university is to educate its students, not to restrain, diagnose, or treat them.
Because universities are incapable of preventing rampage killings,
imposing a duty to do so would result in a paranoid farce. It would be
unfair not only to the universities, but to the students, who would be forced
into an adversarial relationship with their educators and with each other.
This scenario would in turn result in increased stress and isolation not only
for students at risk of becoming violent, but for any student who could be
mistaken for one. Imposing a duty to prevent rampage killings upon
universities would destroy more lives than the extraordinarily rare
incidents that imposing the duty was intended to prevent.
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